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Abstract
This paper tries to assess the possible existence of excess of capacity for the Spanish 
port infrastructures. In order to do this, we estimate a cost function system considering 
the existence of demand uncertainty of cargo and passengers for port authorities. We 
find that, in order to fulfil the regularity conditions of the cost function system, we have 
to specify both demands as uncertain. The results show the importance of passenger 
variability in terms of demand of variable inputs and the use of quasi-fixed input. We 
also demonstrate the excess of capacity from the calculation of the shadow price of the 
quasi-fixed input after controlling demand uncertainty. Finally, some factors as the size 
of the port authorities’ hinterland, the relative specialization in containerised general 
cargo or passengers, the size of ports, the profitability rate or port regulation are consid-
ered as determinants of this excess of capacity.
Key Words: ports; uncertainty of demand; cost function; overcapacity
Resumen
Se estudia la posible existencia de exceso de capacidad en las infraestructuras 
portuarias españolas. Para ello se estima un sistema de costes para las autoridades 
portuarias españolas en el que se incluye la incertidumbre en la demanda tanto para 
el tráfico de mercancía como para el de pasajeros. Se ha encontrado que para que 
sistema de costes cumpla todas las condiciones de regularidad es necesario incluir en la 
especificación la incertidumbre. Los resultados muestran la importancia de la variabilidad 
de pasajeros dado su efecto en las demandas de los factores productivos y en el uso del 
input quasi-fijo. También se demuestra la existencia de sobrecapacidad a partir del 
cálculo del precio sombra del input quasi-fijo una vez controlada la incertidumbre de la 
demanda. Finalmente, algunos factores tales como el tamaño del hinterland en el que la 
autoridad portuaria está localizada, la especialización relativa de la autoridad portuaria 
en los tráficos de contenedores y pasajeros, el tamaño de los puertos o su rentabilidad 
han sido considerados como posibles determinantes de este exceso de capacidad.
Palabras Clave: puertos; incertidumbre en la demanda; función de costes; sobrecapacidad
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1. Introduction.
The Spanish port system has been the subject of significant regulatory changes during 
the last twenty five years. In this period, different public reforms have been carried out 
changing the way in which Spanish ports operate. Castillo-Manzano, López-Valpuesta 
and Pérez (2008), Núñez-Sánchez and Coto-Millán (2012) or Rodríguez-Álvarez and 
Tovar (2012) analyze the effects of port sector reforms in Spain showing that they had 
important effects on productivity and efficiency. These reforms have led the Spanish 
port authorities to operate according to the principles of a landlord port model: financial 
and operating autonomy, increased inter-port and intra-port competition and participa-
tion of the private sector in port activities. In this way, the port authority just provides 
the port infrastructure and regulates the use of port space. Port services are essentially 
provided by private sector operators under an authorisation or a concession regime 
(World Bank, 2007). However, Spanish port regulators have not allowed the existence 
of differences in prices among ports avoiding price-based competition. In this context, 
port authorities have had strong incentives to invest in capacity in order to attract more 
traffic of cargo and passengers. But this is not the only possible cause of port overcapac-
ity. Haralambides (2002) identifies other factors which have guided port authorities to 
over-invest in capacity. Some of them are related with political issues, as the conception 
of ports as tools of regional development, technological issues, as capital indivisibilities 
(lumpy investments), economies of scale in port construction, increasing employment 
of containerships and larger vessels and planning issues, as the over-optimistic demand 
forecasts. Additionally, Luo, Liu and Gao (2012) consider that overcapacity could be a 
strategy for port authorities in order to gain credibility and effectiveness of preemptive 
measures (strategic issue). In this sense, the excess of capacity would not only attract 
more traffic, but also it would be a signal of reliability. This aspect is particularly relevant 
for those types of traffic under increased competitive pressure e.g. the case of container-
ised cargo or passenger traffic. 
In this paper we focus on the possible existence of overcapacity in Spanish port 
authorities during the period 1986-2005 considering the effect of port demand variabil-
ity on their costs, variable input demands and their quasi-fixed input. To achieve this 
aim, a system of equation formed by a short run variable cost function and input expen-
ditures equations is estimated including proxies of demand variability for cargo and pas-
sengers. Other studies that have studied the existence of overcapacity in Spanish ports 
are Baños-Pino, Coto-Millán and Rodríguez-Álvarez (1999) and Rodríguez-Álvarez and 
Tovar (2012). Both papers demonstrate that ports authorities overuse their quasi-fixed 
inputs in the short- run, suggesting that adjustment in capacity investments are neces-
sary in order to reach the long-run equilibrium. However, none of them have consid-
ered the inclusion of demand uncertainty on their specifications. Other two papers have 
considered demand variability in the production process of the cargo handling industry 
(Rodríguez-Álvarez, Tovar and Wall (2011), and Tovar and Wall (2012)). Nevertheless, 
both studies focus on the effect of demand uncertainty on cost efficiency, economies of 
scale and scope. Finally, Tovar and Wall (2014) analyse the impact of demand uncertain 
on port infrastructure costs. This paper is quite similar to ours but some significant dif-
ferences exist, mainly methodological. Firstly, these authors focus in the cost of uncer-
tainty whereas we analyse port overcapacity. Secondly, they do not include passengers’ 
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variability because it results non-significant when it is included in their regression. Nor 
they include the interactions between variability and inputs which allows to obtain the 
effect of uncertainty in inputs’ demands. Third, variability is estimated in a different way 
in both papers. Tovar and Wall (2014) assume that cargo demand follows an autoregres-
sive process of order 1 instead an autoregressive process of order 3 as we do. Moreover 
we approximate demand variability as predicted standard errors of this AR(3) process, 
however Tovar and Wall (2014) use predicted standard errors from a second regression 
where they regress the log of the squared estimated errors from the AR(1) process on 
port dummies and the lag of demand. Finally, they allows the coefficient associated with 
the quasi-fixed input to be positive. This fact is accepted by some authors arguing that 
reflects overcapacity, notwithstanding other authors consider this positive parameter as 
a misspecification of the model. The novelty in our study comes from that we focus on 
the infrastructure provision carried out by port authorities taking into account the inter-
action between demand uncertainty and port capacity, considered in our specification 
as a quasi-fixed input. In this way, we are able to observe whether the non-inclusion of 
demand uncertainty for cargo and passengers may cause biased results regarding the 
correct specification of the variable cost function. Additionally, we evaluate through a 
panel data model some observable factors which may partially cause the overcapacity of 
port authorities, taking into account both time-constant unobservable effects for every 
port authority and time effects.
The paper is structured as follows. First, in Section 2 we present the theoretical model 
of port authorities considering the existence of demand uncertainty. Section 3 presents 
the data used and some descriptive statistics of the different variables. Section 4 shows 
the econometric specification of the demand variability and next, the short-run variable 
cost system of equations. Section 5 shows the results of the estimations. Finally, Section 
6 offers some conclusions and implications.
2. Demand uncertainty and overcapacity on 
provision of port infrastructure and services 
As we have mentioned in the introduction, Spanish port authorities follow a landlord 
port model. They own the infrastructure, take decisions about the use of space, construc-
tion and financing of port infrastructure, as well as decisions about the provision and 
allocation of space to private companies which operate in the port. The port authority 
is responsible for the optimal operation of the facility, public or private, and security 
within the port. These infrastructures usually have an indivisible nature, this means 
that port infrastructure cannot adapt immediately to changes in demand, and therefore 
ports should have minimum dimensions and infrastructures to enable them to supply 
its potential demand. The problem arises in those periods when there are unexpected 
increases in demand. If ports do not have an excess capacity to enable them to face these 
increases, ships may suffer delays and congestion problems which in turn may lead to 
their clients to replace the port with a less congested one, generating reputation problems 
and loss of potential shippers. Then, ports do not want to deny clients due to potential 
excess demand. Thus, it is important that ports have sufficient capacity to keep the prob-
ability of excess demand below a desire level. This fact encourages overcapacity in ports.
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This can be modelled following Duncan (1990). Duncan develops a theoretical model 
which allows model the capacity service target of a firm. This model was empirically 
implemented by Anderson and Gaynor (1995) to hospital services.
The model assumes whether the output produced by a port authority (yht) is function 
of a set of inputs (xht) and demand that port faces (dht) is a random variable with a condi-
tional distribution on realizations in previous periods (dht-k) which represents all relevant 
information than can be used to forecast the probability of demand exceeds capacity, we 
can obtain this probability which is equal to one minus the conditional distribution of 
the output on demand realizations in previous periods. As mentioned before, ports do 
not want to deny services to shippers, so they need to keep that probability under a given 
level α, then:
 (1)
Then, if  is invertible, we can replace  by 
. This relation describes the production process of a port which 
produces so that demand exceeds capacity with probably α, being the port authorities’ 
production equal to their capacity target objective.
Therefore, the cost minimization problem is performed by adding the constraint that 
demand exceeds supply on average only α per cent of time to the standard cost minimiza-
tion problem.
Based on the empirically implementation of Duncan (1990) model (Gaynor and 
Anderson, 1995) we consider two categories of inputs: quasi-fixed and variable inputs. 
Quasi-fixed input is the factor which cannot readily varied in response to unexpected 
realizations of demand (Sht); and variable inputs are factors which can be purchased in 
spot markets and can be perfectly adjusted once actual demand is realized (xht). Variable 
inputs are chosen ex ante before demand is realized, but variable inputs can be varied in 
response to realizations of demand. So port authorities first choose variable and quasi-
fixed inputs that minimize ex-ante cost with the constraint that demand can exceed sup-
ply on average only α per cent of time. From this minimization problem we are able to 
derivate ex-ante inputs demand, which depend on inputs prices, quasi-fixed input and 
capacity service target.
Additionally, Gaynor and Anderson (1995) suppose that the firm can adjust its vari-
able inputs in the spot market once demand is realized. Then, in a second stage, the firm 
minimizes its ex-post cost, conditional on the ex-ante input demands, and subject to the 
production constraint. So ex-post cost can be expressed as
 (2)
Additionally, we can obtain the short run total cost function: 
 (3)
Demand uncertainty and overcapacity in port infrastructures: 
the role of passengers and the effect of regulation.
Revista de Evaluación de Programas y Políticas Públicas  | Núm. 4 (2015), pp.17-35  
22
where TC is the short-run total cost function, y is the vector for outputs, w is the 
vector of input prices, S is the quasi-fixed input,  is the target service 
capacity, VC is the short run variable cost function and r is the price of quasi-fixed input.
By minimizing the short-run total cost function we obtain the optimal quasi-fixed 
input level.
  (4)
which implies
 
 
(5)
A unit increase in a quasi-fixed input has two effects. First, it increases the quasi-fixed 
costs. But, second, it should lower short-run total variable costs. Equation (5) shows 
that a port authority should expand its quasi-fixed input as long as the savings on vari-
able costs more than offset the increase in quasi-fixed costs. In this way, in the long-run 
equilibrium, the port authority is using an optimal amount of the quasi-fixed input so 
the variable cost savings just equal the unit price of the quasi-fixed input. In fact, the 
left-hand side of this equation (5) shows the saving of variable costs due to the increase 
of the quasi-fixed input, also known as the shadow price of the quasi-fixed input (rs). 
Meanwhile, the right-hand side is the unit price of the quasi-fixed input, which it should 
be evaluated in terms of the opportunity cost of the quasi-fixed input (r). If both prices 
are equal the quasi-fixed input is optimally allocated. Thus, this equality allows us to 
test whether overcapacity occurs in Spanish ports or not by comparing the shadow price 
of storage area with its actual value (Baños-Pino, Coto-Millán and Rodríguez-Álvarez, 
1999) following equation (6).
 (6)
if qht = 1 there is a long-run optimal allocation of the quasi-fixed input. When qht> 1 
the shadow price of the quasi-fixed input is lower than its opportunity cost so this input 
is being overused and thus overcapacity exists. Finally, if qht< 1 the quasi-fixed input is 
being underused, so the port authority should expand its quasi-fixed input.
3. Data
The sample consists of 26 port authorities which manage 45 ports considered as 
being of general interest in Spain. For these ports annual data from 1986 until 2005 are 
available, being the complete panel data set of 520 observations1. 
The data were gathered from the annual reports published by Puertos del Estado 
(several years, a and b) which provides homogeneous information about the perform-
ance of Spanish port authorities.
1 It is necessary to point out that the authorities from Almería and Motril are separated since 2005. 
However, in order to simplify the analysis, both authorities have been considered as a unit during the whole 
sample period. Additionally, the Port Authority of Sevilla was not included in the analysis as it is the only 
river port and, therefore, its cost structure responds to a quite different technology.
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The port activity is a multiproduct one, for this reason we have taken into account 
the following outputs: movements of liquid bulk (y1) and solid bulk (y2), containerised 
general cargo (y3), non-containerised general cargo (y4) and passengers (y5).
The input variables prices are: labour price (w1), variable capital price (w2) and 
intermediate consumption price (w3). We also consider the storage area of the port as a 
quasi-fixed input (S). Labour price is defined as the ratio of annual labour expenses by 
total employees. Variable capital price has been approximated by multiplying a building 
index price of public works (obtained from the reports of Confederación Nacional de 
la Construcción, SEOPAN) by the sum of long-term interest rate and the depreciation 
rate the port’s property and equipment. The depreciation rate is calculated as the annual 
depreciation expenditures of each port authority over the total assets. Finally, intermedi-
ate consumption price is defined as the ratio resulted by dividing intermediate consump-
tion expense by intermediate consumptions measured in physical units. 
We also include labour (E1), capital (E2) and intermediate consumptions (E3) expenses 
and the standard deviation of demand of total cargo and passengers traffic (σf and σp).
As we mentioned in Section 3, the market price of storage area has been included in 
our analysis to test whether overcapacity really occurs. This unit value, evaluated as the 
opportunity cost of the storage area, has been obtained from the public fees charged by 
port authorities to private port operators for using their public space, which Puertos del 
Estado annually publishes joint with the storage area of each port authority. In this way, 
given that Law 27/1992 indicates that these fees are equal to the six per cent of the land 
market value, we are able to determine the unit market value of the storage area. 
Table 1: variables and simple descriptive statistics of the simple for the period 1986-2005
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4. Econometric Specification.
4.1. Econometric specification for demand uncertainty.
Equation (2) shows that the variable cost is function of some observed variables: 
actual output, input prices and the quasi-fixed input which have been described in Section 
2; and an unobserved one as the capacity which meets the desired turnaway probability. 
As the target service capacity is not directly observable, we assume that greater 
demand uncertain needs greater reserve service capacity to meet this demand. Thus, 
the target service capacity is function of demand variability which can be approximated 
by the standard deviation of demand (Gaynor and Anderson, 1995; Rodríguez-Álvarez, 
2011; Tovar and Wall, 2012 y 2014). So, in our study, an approximation of variability of 
demand for cargo and passengers, σf and σp, are included in the model.
To estimate the standard errors of demand, since the demand ex-ante is an unobserv-
able variable, we use the actual traffic of cargo and passengers as a proxy. Then we esti-
mate a demand forecast equation following Gaynor and Anderson (1995). Considering 
that demand depends on past realizations, an autoregressive process of order three, 
AR(3), has been estimated for both cargo and passengers. We adopt the following strat-
egy for the estimation: first, we regress demand of period t on demand of periods t-1, t-2, 
t-3 for both traffics, including not only past information, but also port authority dum-
mies and a time trend; once we have the estimations of the AR(3) processes, we proceed 
to estimate their corresponding standard errors. 
Thus, the cost function becomes                                              (7)
where VC is the variable cost, y is the vector of inputs, σ is the vector of demand 
uncertain variables, w is the vector of input prices and S is the input quasi-fixed.
4.2. Econometric specification for the short-run variable cost system.
Once we have obtained the estimation of the demand variability variables, we pro-
ceed to specify the short-run variable cost system. For the estimation of the cost system, 
formed by the short run variable cost function and the input expenditure equations, a 
flexible functional form has been chosen, the multiproduct quadratic cost function. In 
this specification the variables, excepting those which are proxy of demand variability, 
are deviated from their means. This system of equations once the quadratic functional 
form has been applied is the following one:
 
(8)
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The input expenditures equations can be obtained by applying the Shephard’s Lemma 
to the cost function. Additionally, interactions of demand variability with input prices 
and quasi-fixed input are included in our model to allow variability gets not only into the 
variable cost but also in the input expenditures equations and therefore, we could test 
whether demand uncertainty affects input demands or not. Thus, the input expenditures 
equations included in the short-run variable cost function have been specified as follow:
 (9)
where VC is the variable total cost, yr is the amount of output r (r=1,...,5), wj is the 
price of variable input j (j=1,...,3), S is the quasi-fixed input, σf is the proxy of demand 
variability of total cargo moved by the Spanish port authorities, σp is the proxy of demand 
variability in the case of passengers, Ej is the input j expenditure, T is a time trend rep-
resenting neutral technical change, h=1,…,H relates to the h-th authority, t relates to the 
time period and finally, to capture individual firm-specific effects, PA represents port 
authorities dummies. Those variables which have a bar on the top correspond to the 
sample means.
4.3. Econometric specification for the short-run variable cost system.
Finally, once overcapacity indices are obtained, we analyse some of the potential fac-
tors which cause overcapacity by equation (10). In this way we have considered variables 
related to the traffic composition. Usually, high percentages of containerised cargo are 
expected to increase the excess of capacity, given the competitive pressure of container-
ized traffic, with respect to solid or liquid bulk. The same applies to the case of passenger 
traffic, those port authorities with a greater intensity of passenger traffic present higher 
levels of overcapacity (strategic issues). Another possible explanatory factor could be 
related to the regulatory framework, given that Spanish port regulators follow the self-
financing principle. This rule tries to mitigate possible problems of moral hazard with 
individual port authorities (regulatory issue). In this sense, we have included the profit-
ability rate of each port authority. Given the Spanish port finance system, we could expect 
that those port authorities with better performance may finance capacity expansions. On 
the other hand, we may consider that these port authorities achieve better results due 
to the fact that they are efficient, so they do not present higher levels of overcapacity. 
Therefore, the effect is not clear. Another factor related with overcapacity could be the 
economic importance of the port authority’s hinterland, proxied by the GDP of the region 
in which the port is located. We expect that the larger the size of the hinterland, the lower 
the excess port capacity, due to the lower degree of spatial competition between ports 
(strategic issue). We also included the size of the port authority, measured by total cargo 
loaded/unloaded. Due to the existence of important capital indivisibilities, we consider 
that those port authorities with higher levels of traffic present lower overcapacity prob-
lems (technological issue). Finally, we have added temporal dummies in order to capture 
common temporal factors for all port authorities (political issues). For instance, those 
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legal changes which affected the whole port system that we mentioned before (reforms 
in 1992 and 1997). Unfortunately, these variables presumably do not totally capture all 
of issues mentioned in section 1: political, technological, planning or strategic issues. 
However, the panel structure of our data can be used to obtain consistent estimators 
in the presence of omitted variables. The estimation of a fixed effects model assumes 
that unobserved effects are constant over time. Including dummies variables for port 
authorities and time, we are able to capture both time-constant unobserved effects and 
time effects.
(10)
where q are the overcapacity indices, contratio is the percentage of containerised 
cargo over total traffic, GDP is the gross domestic product of the hinterland where port 
authorities are located, prof is the profitability rate of port authorities, pasimp is the 
number of passengers on port surface, size is the total cargo traffic, PA is an individual 
dummy variable for each port authority, TD is a temporal dummy, h=1,…,H corresponds 
to the h-th authority and t relates to the time period.
5. Estimation and results 
The system of equations (8)-(9) has been estimated by seemingly unrelated regres-
sions (SUR) model. In order to exploit the panel data structure, a fixed effects estimator 
has been applied for all specifications, considering the possible existence of time-con-
stant unobserved effects.
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation using three different specifications for 
the system of equations with the aim of evaluate the robustness of the results: in speci-
fication 1 demand variability is not included; specification 2 includes the existence of 
demand uncertainty for cargo and passengers; and finally in specification 3 we just con-
sider passengers’ variability of demand, which we discuss below. The system of equations 
is formed by the short-run variable cost function and their three corresponding variable 
input expenditure equation.
Variables
Specification 1 Specification2 Specification3
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Constant 19 638 778 5.435 10 447 635 1.918 9 119 287 1.841
w
1
201.52 49.128 142.43 2.858 102.11 3.884
w
2
1 188 425 55.075 1 131 607 3.389 773 994.4 5.189
w
3
12 064 408 36.143 12 706 663 4.486 10 472 473 15.115
Table 2: Estimation of the short run variable cost system using three different specifications. 
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Variables
Specification 1 Specification2 Specification3
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
y
1
0.046 0.410 0.088 0.726 0.074 0.624
y
2
0.395 1.853 0.454 1.843 0.491 2.012
y
3
0.122 0.591 0.361 1.643 0.394 1.920
y
4
0.561 1.049 0.078 0.133 0.164 0.283
y
5
2.081 3.180 2.077 2.531 2.022 2.500
S 2.408 1.848 -30.601 -3.546 -31.559 -3.776
w
1
*w
1
-0.001 -9.200 -0.000 -8.551 -0.001 -8.612
w
2
*w
2
-8466.79 -2.671 -8207.31 -2.300 -7557.81 -2.166
w
3
*w
3
-4 550 047 -9.390 -4 137 815 -8.003 -4 224 733 -8.161
y
1
*y
1
0.000 -0.622 0.000 -1.303 0.000 -1.333
y
2
*y
2
0.000 -0.560 0.000 0.794 0.000 0.627
y
3
*y
3
0.000 -2.789 0.000 -2.837 0.000 -2.919
y
4
*y
4
0.000 1.389 0.000 2.048 0.000 1.998
y
5
*y
5
0.000 0.145 0.000 1.167 0.000 1.261
S*S 0.000 -0.211 0.000 -0.791 0.000 -0.627
w
1
*w
2
6.761 6.018 8.067 7.119 8.136 7.243
w
1
*w
3
28.041 1.218 28.606 1.231 22.109 0.951
w
2
*w
3
314 356.2 4.653 294 835.5 4.077 281 494.8 3.918
y
1
*y
2
0.000 5.601 0.000 5.212 0.000 5.324
y
1
*y
3
0.000 -1.394 0.000 0.428 0.000 0.439
y
1
*y
4
0.000 -0.733 0.000 -1.549 0.000 -1.604
y
1
*y
5
0.000 -1.427 0.000 -1.786 0.000 -1.660
y
2
*y
3
0.000 -0.525 0.000 -0.233 0.000 -0.364
y
2
*y
4
0.000 -2.542 0.000 -1.318 0.000 -1.252
y
2
*y
5
0.000 2.984 0.000 2.892 0.000 2.857
y
3
*y
4
0.000 3.337 0.000 2.850 0.000 2.788
y
3
*y
5
0.000 2.597 0.000 1.431 0.000 1.367
y
4
*y
5
0.000 -0.955 0.000 -2.606 0.000 -2.726
w
1
*y
1
0.000 2.558 0.000 3.029 0.000 2.825
w
1
*y
2
0.000 3.191 0.000 2.669 0.000 2.667
w
1
*y
3
0.000 -0.037 0.000 0.970 0.000 0.898
w
1
*y
4
0.000 1.219 0.000 0.526 0.000 0.472
w
1
*y
5
0.000 2.493 0.000 2.088 0.000 2.085
w
2
*y
1
0.037 9.600 0.039 9.034 0.037 8.999
Table 2: Estimation of the short run variable cost system using three different specifications (cont.)
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Variables
Specification 1 Specification2 Specification3
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
w
2
*y
2
0.050 7.401 0.049 6.703 0.049 6.701
w
2
*y
3
-0.006 -0.822 -0.001 -0.187 -0.003 -0.353
w
2
*y
4
0.265 9.990 0.244 8.211 0.241 8.156
w
2
*y
5
0.029 1.170 0.021 0.773 0.023 0.848
w
3
*y
1
0.2538 4.9251 0.2878 5.3237 0.2718 5.0674
w
3
*y
2
0.5027 5.7013 0.5573 6.2074 0.5679 6.3425
w
3
*y
3
0.9822 8.6022 1.0592 8.9493 1.0600 9.0717
w
3
*y
4
-0.5324 -1.7675 -0.6907 -2.1528 -0.7139 -2.2788
w
3
*y
5
1.7095 5.1400 1.9119 4.8382 1.8545 5.0708
y
1
*S 0.0000 0.6420 0.0000 0.8116 0.0000 0.8784
y
2
*S 0.0000 -0.3342 0.0000 -1.6195 0.0000 -1.6096
y
3
*S 0.0000 1.7051 0.0000 1.4205 0.0000 1.4400
y
4
*S 0.0000 -3.4990 0.0000 -2.8740 0.0000 -2.9274
y
5
*S 0.0000 -0.1713 0.0000 -0.4685 0.0000 -0.3759
w
1
*S 0.0001 9.8926 0.0001 10.7469 0.0001 10.7889
w
2
*S 0.7215 13.0702 0.7678 12.7776 0.7686 12.8243
w
3
*S 5.9322 8.2092 5.8692 7.7626 5.8303 7.8056
T -82 874.10 -2.5428 -10 4891.70 -2.5836 -102 416.40 -2.5524
T2 10 659.91 2.5745 11 753.74 2.0020 11 616.72 2.0049
σ
p
 254 903.20 4.5027 256 314.20 4.6066
σ
p
*S  0.8139 4.2152 0.7883 4.2336
σ
p
*w
1
 1.8556 3.0210 2.0191 3.5186
σ
p
*w
2
 8795.81 2.6778 8956.81 2.7516
σ
p
*w
3
 16 193.16 0.5491 32 667.42 2.1532
σ
f
 -2043.98 -0.4103   
σ
f
*S  -0.0048 -0.6062   
σ
f
*w
1
 -0.0915 -0.8177   
σ
f
*w
2
 -952.45 -1.1345   
σ
f
*w
3
 -4551.01 -0.6862   
* Port authorities dummies have been omitted
Table 2: Estimation of the short run variable cost system using three different specifications (cont.)
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Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Observations 520 442 442
R2 0.955 0.961 0.961
Adjusted R2 0.946 0.951 0.952
S.E. of regression 3006937 2917533 2892551
R2labour expenditure 
equation 
0.567 0.641 0.641
R2capital expenditure 
equation 
0.771 0.772 0.772
R2intermediate consumption 
expenditure equation
0.659 0.669 0.670
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the estimation of the short run variable cost system using 
three different specifications. 
We observe that specification 1 satisfies some of the regularity conditions: the short-
run variable cost function is non-decreasing and quasi-concave in variable inputs prices, 
non-decreasing in outputs and homogeneous of degree one in input prices2. However, 
the coefficient related to the quasi-fixed area is positive and statistically different from 
zero. So according to this specification, one square meter increase of the storage area 
increases short-run variable costs. Some previous studies argue that this result indicates 
that firms are operating with considerable excess capacity (Viton, 1981). Nevertheless, 
we consider that the short-run variable cost function does not fulfill the regularity con-
ditions and hence it does not capture the implicit technology. This fact shows that not 
taking into account demand uncertain can lead to misspecifications. 
In specification 2 we include the existence of demand uncertainty for port authorities. 
Appendix A includes the estimates of the autoregressive processes (AR(3)) from which the 
demand variability variables have been obtained. The models perform well, satisfying the reg-
ularity conditions. In this way, first order coefficients related to the variable input prices are 
positive and statistically significant. For the case of outputs, parameters related to solid bulks, 
containerised cargo and passengers are positive and statistically different from zero. Given that 
the variables are deviated with respect to their means, output coefficients can be interpreted 
as the marginal cost of each category of traffic at the sample mean. Non-containerised general 
cargo and liquid bulk have positive coefficients but not different from zero. Additionally, we 
find evidence of the existence of technological progress since the coefficient associated to the 
trend is negative and significant. The coefficients related with demand variability of cargo and 
its interactions are all non-significant whereas the parameters associated to uncertainty for 
passenger traffic are significant, with only one exception (σpw3). In this sense, the coefficient 
related to the demand uncertainty of passengers (σp) shows us that those ports which faces 
higher variability in their demand incurs in higher costs than those with lower uncertainty, 
for a given level of passengers. Moreover, regarding the interactions between the demand 
uncertainty passenger variable with input prices we conclude that port authorities increase 
the use of their labour and variable capital input in respond to demand uncertainty.
2  Unlike other functional forms for modeling the cost function the condition of homogeneity of degree 
one is imposed, in the case of the quadratic functional form we carry out a hypothesis testing procedure. In 
our case, the null hypothesis could not be rejected, so we conclude that short-run variable cost function is 
homogeneous of degree one.
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Regarding the storage area coefficient, it is negative and statistically significant at 
the sample mean. So one square meter increase of the storage area decreases short-run 
variable costs by 30.6 €. Therefore, the inclusions of demand uncertainty variables in our 
system of equations achieve capture adequately the technology of port authorities.
Given that demand variability of cargo and its interactions are all non-significant, we 
calculate Specification 3, in which we just consider demand uncertainty of passengers. As 
we observe, results do not change substantially.
From deriving the variable cost with respect the quasi-fixed input, it is possible to 
calculate the shadow price of storage area (rs) for all observations in order to test the 
possibility of overcapacity, by comparing rs with the market price of the storage area (r). 
Figure 1 shows the mean values of that ratio (q) for each port authority. All authorities 
present levels of q higher than one, excepting Bahía de Cádiz, so we can affirm that over-
capacity occurs in most of the Spanish port authorities. The highest levels correspond to 
Ceuta and Melilla which are considered as strategic ports given that are located in Africa, 
followed by port authorities located in islands (Baleares, Las Palmas and Tenerife), 
Huelva and Alicante.
Figure 1: Overcapacity indices (qh) for each port authority evaluated at their means
On the other hand, in Figure 2 we focus on the evolution of these indices for the whole 
Spanish port system. As we observe overcapacity has increased over the time distinguish-
ing two different periods. During the first one, between 1986 until 1996, overcapacity 
increases, after the admission of Spain in the European Common Market and the first 
important reform of port authorities (Act 27/1992). The second period, starts in 1998 
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one year after the 1997 reform (Act 62/1997), in which public regional governments were 
allowed appoint members of the port authority governing board. This new regulatory 
change increases the conception of ports as tools of regional development. Additionally, 
as we mentioned in the introduction, in this period port regulators have not allowed 
the existence of differences in prices among ports avoiding price-based competition (3rd 
Transitory Regulation of Law 62/1997).Within this context, port authorities had strong 
incentives to invest in capacity rather than prices.
Figure 2: Evolution of overcapacity indices (qt) for the period 1986-2005
Therefore, although we have included demand variability in our short-run variable 
cost function, we observe that overcapacity in Spanish port system still remains. This fact 
could suggest that there would be other additional factors which could explain the over-
capacity of the Spanish port authorities during this period. So we have evaluate these 
possible factors of overcapacity. In this way, we have first estimated equation (10) by 
OLS. Table 3 reports the results.
OLS 2SLS
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
const 4.515 2.273 1.488 0.460
contratio 14.009 5.253 19.224 2.321
GDP -8.68E-08 -4.553 0.000 -2.936
prof 7.295 1.505 24.156 1.773
pasimp 0.283 7.797 0.370 2.070
size -1.35E-07 -3.104 0.000 -2.033
Table 4: Determinants of overcapacity
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OLS 2SLS
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Alicante 1.980 1.072 3.535 1.083
Almería-Motril 0.152 0.093 1.850 0.838
Avilés -4.729 -2.281 -1.786 -0.534
Bahía de Cádiz -2.847 -1.585 -0.931 -0.315
Barcelona 3.197 2.430 4.129 1.869
Bilbao -0.201 -0.134 2.760 0.960
Cartagena -2.659 -1.462 -0.327 -0.117
Castellón -0.722 -0.432 1.472 0.558
Ceuta -8.017 -3.091 -9.857 -1.072
Ferrol-San 
Cibrao
-2.071 -1.089 0.504 0.173
Gijón -0.838 -0.439 2.292 0.705
Huelva 7.695 4.997 10.635 4.170
A Coruña -1.106 -0.622 1.466 0.522
Las Palmas -1.980 -1.102 -0.573 -0.168
Málaga 1.058 0.617 3.614 1.440
Melilla 2.692 1.237 4.739 1.415
Baleares -2.659 -1.417 -0.918 -0.341
Pasajes -1.698 -0.867 1.563 0.480
Marín y Ría de 
Pontevedra
-3.200 -1.611 -1.159 -0.362
Santa Cruz de 
Tenerife
-4.168 -2.425 -2.323 -0.974
Santander -4.744 -2.235 -1.661 -0.486
Tarragona 4.934 3.601 7.566 2.524
Valencia -6.718 -4.437 -6.412 -1.886
Vigo -5.961 -3.030 -5.051 -1.299
Vilagarcía -3.459 -1.654 -0.070 -0.020
D88 -0.526 -0.686 -0.951 -0.768
D89 0.463 0.597 -0.028 -0.028
D90 0.690 0.886 0.201 0.222
D91 1.184 1.511 0.761 0.799
D92 1.520 1.928 1.038 0.966
D93 2.538 3.223 2.686 2.435
D94 2.941 3.718 2.598 3.264
Table 4: Determinants of overcapacity (cont.)
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OLS 2SLS
Variables Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
D95 3.578 4.488 3.381 4.366
D96 3.999 4.970 3.785 4.398
D97 3.908 4.771 3.857 5.087
D98 4.164 4.991 3.960 4.654
D99 4.076 4.762 3.722 4.458
D00 4.705 5.336 4.308 4.626
D01 5.596 6.147 5.155 5.244
D02 6.279 6.692 5.828 5.085
D03 7.399 7.632 6.940 5.034
D04 7.309 7.639 6.903 5.142
D05 6.849 7.023 6.445 3.853
Observations 520 494
R2 0.706 0.701
Adjusted R2 0.676 0.668
S.E. of regression 3.141 3.229
Table 4: Determinants of overcapacity (cont.)
The coefficient related to the share of containerised cargo on total traffic (contratio) 
and passenger traffic (pasimp) are positive and statistically significant, thus suggesting 
that the specialization on these types of traffic may lead the port authority to overinvest 
in capacity. On the other hand, the coefficient related to the hinterland size of the region 
where port authorities are located (GDP) has a negative and significant impact on excess 
of capacity. So, port authorities located in larger regions present lower excess capacity 
problems. The variable which controls the size of the port authority (size) also present a 
statistically positive coefficient. The existence of important fixed-capital indivisibilities 
or lumpy investments could explain these results. The estimation also indicates that the 
profitability rate of port authorities (prof) is not a significant variable. We also observe 
that both port authorities and time effects are highly significant. It is particularly interest-
ing to analyse how coefficients related to time effects are not statistically different from 
1986 until 1992, but in 1993 start to diverge. This result may suggest the effect of 1992 
port reform on excess of capacity. We observe a similar effect after 2000, from which 
the coefficients increase in greater proportion than in previous years. Nevertheless, a 
potential pitfall of the results is that OLS do not consider possible problems of endog-
eneity in some explanatory. In order to solve this potential problem, we estimate (16) 
using Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) using as instruments lags of contratio, pasimp, 
size and prof. The results confirm the relationships explained before, but in this case the 
coefficient related to profitability rate of port authorities (prof) turn to be statistically 
significant, so there is a positive and significant correlation between excess of capacity 
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and higher profit rates. Finally, temporal dummies bear out conclusions from figure 2, 
showing two different trends in overcapacity. Highest level of overcapacity with respect 
to the reference year, 1987, are those corresponding to the subsequent years to entry on 
force of the Law 62/1997. On the other hand, overcapacity seems to fall in the periods 
after Law 48/2003 came of force. This law is stricter with the objective of self-financing 
and operational costs coverage than the previous ones. 
6. Conclusions and implications
This study analyses the overcapacity of the Spanish port authorities, taking into 
account the potential effect of the demand variability of cargo and passengers on the 
Spanish port authorities’ productive process. Then, we have estimated jointly a short-run 
variable cost function with their corresponding input expenditure equations using three 
different specifications in order to check the robustness of the results. In the first speci-
fication, demand uncertainty has not been included in the model having found specifica-
tion errors. Furthermore, although we have modelled cargo and passenger uncertainty 
demand, just demand variability of passengers and its interactions with the input prices 
and the quasi-fixed input are significant, which shows the importance of passengers in 
port studies. The results show that for a given level of output, those port authorities 
which face greater demand incurs in higher costs and use more variable inputs than those 
with less uncertain demand. On the other hand, we have demonstrated that overcapac-
ity exists in port authorities and some determinants related to technological, strategic, 
political or regulatory issues, as specialization in certain traffics, port profitability or the 
size of their hinterlands affect to their excess of capacity. Additionally, we can distinguish 
two different trends in overcapacity indices for the whole Spanish port system, concur-
ring one of them with the subsequent years to come into force Law 62/1997 when public 
regional governments have more competences in the port authorities’ performance. It 
seems that an improvement in overcapacity levels occur after Law 48/2003. 
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